Part 1 – How casino junkets work in VIP gambling rooms, luring in whale gamblers from China and how Macau junkets are trying to polish their image

By Christine Duhaime | October 18th, 2013

This article was originally published in Asia Gambling Brief. 

Macau junket operators of casino VIP rooms working on image

Some of Macau’s biggest junket operators — also known as VIP gambling promoters — are planning to exhibit at next month’s Macau Gaming Show in a sign this integral part of the local gaming scene is seeking to polish its reputation.

According to the organizers, junket operators, including Suncity Group, David Group, Jimei Group and Golden Group, have registered and will showcase their business to some 6,500 expected attendees.

Junket operators are an integral part of the Macau gaming scene, bringing in the Mainland Chinese gamblers that account for 75% the industry’s US$38 billion in annual revenue.

However, they have been tarnished by alleged links to organized crime and money laundering, with high-profile government figures acknowledging that part of the junket business has links to criminal organizations.

These allegations have come about because of the VIP promoter’s role in extending credit to high-rolling Chinese gamblers, sometimes helping them circumvent Chinese currency restrictions. But many have now expanded into other areas of business.

Junket operators diversifying

Suncity for example has ventured into finance, property, mining, media and fine dining with the Sky 21 Bar and Restaurant and set up music and film production company Sun Entertainment Culture.

Jimei is involved in financial services in Hong Kong through its Jimei Wealth Management and Jimei Investment Holding divisions and operates a water park and golf course in the Philippines.

This diversification comes amid increased scrutiny of Macau’s anti-money laundering practices from the U.S. and the European Union and threats from China to clamp down on currency movements. The likely changes and their potential impact on Macau’s casinos will form the subject of another article.

Although junkets are branching into other areas, the bulk of their revenue and success is built on their ability to form links with China’s high rollers.

Gambling from China

It’s illegal to advertise gambling in China and currency restrictions prohibit Chinese citizens from exporting more than RMB20,000 per trip to Macau, or more than US$50,000 per year.

Moreover, its illegal to collect gambling debts in China so gaming concessionaires are reluctant to extend credit to Chinese gamblers.

Junket operators solve these problems. In exchange for commissions of 1.25% of the rolling chip turnover, junkets tap into their extensive social networks in Mainland China through sub-agents to recruit high rollers to gamble in Macau at private casino VIP Rooms.

They help Chinese clients get around currency export restrictions through a sophisticated system of loans, whereby the junket operators provide credit in Macau, and the sub-junkets collect gambling debts in China; no money actually crosses the border, avoiding state scrutiny.

They also act as cash couriers for clients, moving vast amounts of funds across informal channels to escape detection and regulatory scrutiny, in violation of China’s anti-money laundering laws

Some of the more obscure schemes have dwindled given the development of the Mainland banking system and more importantly the continuous evolution of the VIP patron profile coming into Macau.

Casinos have long been aware of these problems but they cannot afford to sever contracts with junket operators when their viability is tied to maintaining those relationships.

Valuable VIP client lists

Junket operators most important asset is not the VIP business they bring to casinos in Macau, but their lists of wealthy clients from Mainland China. They brokered deals with gaming concessionaires to operate the private VIP Rooms so that they could control their own clients and their gambling activities (including the vitally important cage transactions) without having to share the client lists with the casinos

VIPs coming into Macau from Mainland China are also becoming more experienced and in some cases shunning the services of the junket operators in favour of dealing directly with the concessionaires. Although the junket operators have provided many advantages to the high rollers, they also come with their own set of restrictions, such as the amount gambled, where and when.

In the U.S., casinos are subject to much greater regulatory control and are not permitted to contract out the operation of VIP Rooms or the cage transaction operations to third parties. Moreover, they are entirely responsible for anti-money laundering compliance, including in VIP Rooms and are heavily fined for compliance failures. The Las Vegas Sands, for example, recently agreed to pay US$47 million to the US government to avoid criminal prosecution for failing to report suspicious activity by one of its VIP Room high rollers.

Anti-money laundering compliance 

From an anti-money laundering (AML) compliance perspective, controlling the cage transactions is key. Without this a casino could have the most sophisticated AML regime in the world, but be unable to control money laundering in its VIP Rooms because it is excluded from knowing its clients, knowing how much they gamble or win, and monitoring or reporting their transactions for suspicious or terrorist transactions. Those obligations are, de facto, left to the VIP Room junket operators. However, junket operators are not required to undertake any AML tasks under Macau’s AML laws.

The result is that no one has responsibility for anti-money laundering or counter-terrorist financing for approximately 75% of Macau’s gambling business.

Macau has avoided state gambling regulatory action, and sanction by the Paris-based Financial Action Task Force (FATF). That’s in large part because the secrecy and complexity of junket operations, and gambling law, make it difficult for FATF officials to understand and properly evaluate. FATF’s Mutual Evaluation of Macau did not note any of the most significant AML deficiencies in Macau casinos; deficiencies that regulators in the U.S. and Canada, among others, have noted.

In June of this year, before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, A.G. Burnett, Chairman of the Nevada Gaming Control Board, noted that while U.S.-based casinos in Macau have robust anti-money laundering procedures, they are vulnerable to money laundering by VIP Room junket transactions that take place outside their purview.

Part 2 of this article is available here.

U.S. Congressional Commission Report urges Macau to implement anti-money laundering controls

By Christine Duhaime | October 18th, 2013

2013 Annual Report

In its 2013 Annual Report, a U.S. Congressional Executive Commission has urged Macau to develop law enforcement mechanisms to combat money laundering at its casinos. The Congressional members found that the gambling industry in Macau was reportedly tied to widespread corruption and the laundering of large amounts of money out of Mainland China.

Moreover, they found that the movement of illicit flows of funds from Mainland China to Macau is “fueled by junkets” which reportedly help wealthy people from the Mainland bypass China’s currency restrictions and move money out of China. The Report cites a professor at the University of Macau who found that, conservatively, US$202 billion in proceeds of crime is funneled to Macau from China annually by junket operators through an underground network and is not reported or declared.

In addition to urging Macau to act on anti-money laundering controls, the Report specifically drew attention to the fact that Macau’s anti-money laundering laws do not have the following: any mechanisms for the freezing of suspicious assets; a currency declaration system; casino customer due diligence obligations; or appropriate thresholds for transaction reports in casinos, all of which are required under the anti-money laundering standards set by the Financial Action Task Force.

Mutual Evaluation & No Progress Made

The Congressional Executive Commission members drew on testimony given by the Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing at the U.S. Department of the Treasury in June 2013, in which it was highlighted that six years on, Macau has a ways to go to correct serious anti-money laundering deficiencies noted in the 2007 Mutual Evaluation by the APG, for the FATF. Those deficiencies were:

  • Macau lacks asset freezing provisional measures in cases of suspected money laundering;
  • Macau is unable to respond to foreign requests on freezing orders;
  • Macau does not have a sanctions regime in place and had not implemented U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373 on the financing of terrorism;
  • Cross-border currency movement is a significant issue for Macau and yet it does not have a disclosure or declaration system on cross border currency;
  • Macau Customs Service do not have the authority to investigate money laundering or terrorist financing cases;
  • Most key aspects of customer due diligence (CDD) obligations are not incorporated into the laws of Macau;
  • The casino sector presents a substantial money laundering risk and features a number of gaps, including:
    • No risk-based assessment of gaming customers and operators;
    • Inadequate inspection and oversight of casinos;
    • No oversight or inspection of junket operators;
    • Lack of communication between the Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau (DICJ) and Macau’s Financial Intelligence Office; and
    • A high monetary threshold for reporting large transactions at casinos.

Symbiotic Relationship

The issue with respect to Macau is that the relationship between junket operators and casinos is symbiotic – 75% of the gambling revenues from Macau is from gamblers from China that are clients of the junket operators. They are brought to Macau by the junket operators and gamble in VIP Rooms in casinos. The VIP Rooms are run by the junket operators. They are not reporting (or obliged) entities and are not subject to anti-money laundering reporting requirements. There is also the concern, as noted in testimony by others before the Commission, that junket operators still have ties to organized crime, particularly the triads. The US$202 billion estimated to be removed from China annually through Macau is allegedly moved by organized crime.

In July 2013, Macau announced that it was considering implementing a cross-border currency declaration regime that would require people entering and leaving Macau to make a declaration with respect to funds above a certain limit.

Vietnam implements anti-money laundering decree

By Christine Duhaime | October 14th, 2013

Response to FATF blacklisting

Following years of pressure, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has implemented anti-money laundering legislation which took effect on Friday. The move was in response to the blacklisting of Vietnam in June by the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF“) for lax anti-money laundering (“AML“) and counter terrorist financing (“CTF“) controls. 14 countries were blacklisted, including Ethiopia and Syria.

AML decree

According to Vietnamese news services, the new AML decree will require that businesses report transactions over a certain threshold and suspicious transactions, to Vietnam’s financial intelligence unit (“FIU“). In addition:

  • Jewellery sellers will have to ascertain the identity of, and report, transactions of US$14,000 or more.;
  • Securities brokers, dealers and real estate vendors will have to report all transactions to the FIU regardless of the amount of the transaction;
  • Banks will have to ascertain the identity of businesses and persons undertaking transactions equal to or greater than VND300 million per day if the person or entity has not undertaken transactions in six months;
  • Casinos will have to ascertain the identity of persons gambling when the bets or the wins are equal to or exceed VND60 million per day;
  • Charities will have to report the names and addresses of organizations and persons who make donations and will have to report how the funds were used; and
  • All obliged or reporting, entities will have to undertake AML risk assessments in respect of their business and implement compliance plans to mitigate those risks.

No AML review undertaken by Vietnam

The State Bank of Vietnam has said that Vietnam has never undertaken an assessment of the country’s exposure to money laundering or terrorist financing and last year, the Bank detected only 165 suspicious transactions in the whole country. Although like China, Vietnam is a country where the a large percentage of citizens opt out of the modern banking system (by literally keeping cash under their mattresses), with a population of 88.8 million, the number of suspicious transactions reported is equivalent to the number typically reported daily by some banks in other countries.

In June, the FATF blacklisted Vietnam because it posed a threat to the financial system, particularly in respect of its lack of legal procedures for dealing with terrorist assets and failure to impose criminal liability for financial crimes on companies, firms and individuals.

The finding by the FATF with respect to Vietnam’s failure to implement legal measures to address terrorist funds and assets must also mean that there is no sanctions regime in place in Vietnam to detect and freeze the assets of listed and designated persons and entities.

Liberty Reserve connection to Vietnam

Also in June, the U.S. Department of Justice announced the indictment of a company called Liberty Reserve, believed to be the largest global money laundering operation, which allegedly involved virtual currency transactions made by a Vietnamese entity, the Thinh Vu Joint Stock Company, allegedly controlled by Vu Van Lang, a Vietnamese citizen. According to the indictment, funds were laundered primarily in Vietnam, Malaysia, Russia and Nigeria. The Social Order Crime Investigation Police Department of Vietnam has stated that the Joint Stock Company was licensed by the government of Vietnam to act as a sub-agent for Hai Phong branch of the Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam to pay remittances from Western Union. The indictment says that Mr. Lang is also alleged to have incorporated a company in Hong Kong called Instant Exchange Limited, to process Liberty Reserve transactions.

FATF and G20 anti-corruption group work towards aligning efforts

By Christine Duhaime | October 12th, 2013

Delegates from the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF“) and the G20 Working Group on Anti-Corruption (“G20 ACWG“) met in Paris today to discuss ways in which both groups could liaise to further initiatives to enforce anti-money laundering (“AML“) and anti-corruption legislation worldwide.

Pursuant to the meeting, the delegates determined that the following areas in the FATF Recommendations need to be focused on by obliged, or reporting, entities to curb money laundering and corruption:

  • Politically Exposed Persons;
  • Wire transfers;
  • Beneficial ownership; and
  • KYC procedures.

The need for the use of financial crime and anti-money laundering experts was highlighted as well as the need to join forces with anti-bribery experts.

To move enforcement efforts forward, the delegates recommended that national agencies enter into MOUs for information sharing for prosecutions so that when one country is undertaking an investigation over bribery, it can obtain from Financial Intelligence Units (“FIU“) in other jurisdictions, reports filed secretly by accountants, banks, brokers etc. with FIUs in respect of persons that are the target of corruption and bribery investigations.

It also recommended that when a person or entity is the target of a bribery investigation, the scope of potential criminal liability include money laundering charges since one necessarily involves the other by virtue of the predicate offence regime.

Issues with respect to beneficial ownership were also discussed, relevant in the context of organized crime and tax evasion. It was recommended that nations ensure legal measures are in place to determine beneficial ownership and require its reporting to FIUs and other government agencies.

The lack of transparency in beneficial ownership is compounded by professional secrecy rules that protect professionals who function as gatekeepers in respect of transactions.

The statement from the FATF can be read here.

International Consortium of Investigative Journalists investigates role of professionals over offshore leaks advice

By Christine Duhaime | October 8th, 2013

ICIJ focusing on professional advice given

At the recent Anti-Money Laundering and Financial Crime Conference held by the Association of Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialists in Las Vegas, Michael Hudson, senior editor of the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (“ICIJ“), gave an interesting presentation on the ICIJ’s work in exposing the use of offshore tax havens – known as the “offshore leaks” investigation.

The offshore leaks investigation identified the existence of over 120,000 offshore companies and trusts used by high-net worth persons and entities around the world. It terms of sheer impact, it was the biggest business story of 2013, resulting in sweeping legislative and policy changes in tax law worldwide and numerous investigations, as well as the toppling of many high-ranking officials.

The ICIJ’s says its work in exposing offshore leaks is not over. It is now focusing its efforts on the role of those professional facilitators who, Mr. Hudson said, advised and assisted clients in creating offshore entities and trusts in tax havens to facilitate tax evasion.

As Mr. Hudson pointed out, incorporating companies and setting up trusts is not illegal in jurisdictions that are known as tax havens, and obviously neither is the use of professionals. The issue is whether professional advisors gave advice on the movement of wealth offshore, or assisted politically exposed persons do so, in contravention of anti-money laundering and tax laws.

Over 2 million taxpayer records

The ICIJ has an enormous amount of evidence to work with. It was given, anonymously, a hard drive with 2.5 million tax payer records identifying more than 100,000 individuals, entities and trusts from over 170 countries, including tens of thousands from Canada and the U.S. with bank accounts in foreign jurisdictions with lax tax rules or strong bank secrecy rules.

The hard drive contains 30-years of emails and other records of transactions and communications used by taxpayers, accountants, lawyers and others in multiple countries to set up foreign companies and move assets. The evidence is the biggest stockpile of inside information about the offshore movement of assets ever obtained by a media organization, more than 160 times larger than the leak of U.S. State Department documents by Wikileaks in 2010.

The ICIJ offshore leaks investigation identified several high profile PEPs, including Pana Merchant, a Canadian Senator, and Thailand’s international trade representative, Nalinee Taveesin. Taveesin is not only a PEP but in 2008, she was listed by The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC“) as a designated person because OFAC determined that she assisted the Mugabe regime complete several financial transactions.

The ICIJ, a network of approximately 175 journalists, was started in 1998 by a producer of 60 Minutes and gained international attention in April when its members released the story of the use of offshore entities by wealthy people around the world.

“The party is over” – Colombia takes action on tax evasion and imposes 33% surtax on “hit list” countries

By Christine Duhaime | October 8th, 2013

Party is over says Colombia Minister of Finance

The government of Colombia is imposing a 33% surtax on assets moved out of the country by its nationals to known tax havens. The surtax will be assessed against individuals and corporations to curb the exodus of funds out of Colombia. The government estimates that the value of annual lost tax revenues from the illicit flow of funds to tax havens is $10.6 billion.

The party is over,” said Colombia’s Finance Minister, in announcing the creation and publication of a “hit list” of 44 nations that are tax havens which include the Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands, Jersey, Isle of Man, Hong Kong, Bahrain and Antigua and Barbuda. Assets moved to “hit list” countries will be targeted for investigation by Colombia and assessed the surtax.

Colombia is one of the few countries in the world that have experienced real GDP growth in the past ten years.

Besides the exodus of wealth, the government estimates further that the amount laundered from Colombia annually is about $17 billion, mostly from proceeds of crime arising from drug trafficking, arms dealing and human trafficking.

Silk Road owner arrested over money laundering charges and allegations of ordering hit on man from Canada

By Christine Duhaime | October 2nd, 2013

Ross Ulbricht, allegedly the Dread Pirate Roberts and owner of the website Silk Road, was arrested by the FBI in San Francisco today at a public library and his popular website was shut down. Silk Road was an Internet-based website that accepted Bitcoin. Ulbricht was charged with money laundering conspiracy, computer hacking conspiracy and drug trafficking.

Alleged to have ordered a hit on Canadian drug dealer

Ulbricht is alleged to have paid $150,000 for the murder of a drug dealer from White Rock, British Columbia, Canada, known as “Friendly Chemist” who tried to extort him for $500,000 to ward off a drug gang. The man from Canada was married with three children. The FBI consulted with Canadian law enforcement who apparently informed the FBI that they do not believe the murder took place because no body was located. The indictment says that the Bitcoin payment was made for the hit and recording on the Blockchain, the hitman confirmed the murder and supplied photos to Ulbricht of a deceased person when the mission was accomplished.

Transactions totalling $1.2 billion in two years

Allegedly, Ulbricht’s transactions using Bitcoin totalled $1.2 billion and generated commissions of $80 million since 2011. The FBI monitored, tracked and collected transactional data on Silk Road since 2011. The majority of the buyers on Silk Road were from the U.S., U.K., Australia, Germany and Canada. About 6% of the Silk Road transactions that involved illegal transactions came from Canada, both on the supply and purchase side meaning that Canadians supplied drugs and other things illegally and bought illegal goods and services on Silk Road.

The allegations

According to the criminal complaint, Silk Road operated like something akin to a Turkish bazaar, only virtual, and is described as a “sprawling, black market bazaar where drugs and other illegal goods and services were bought and sold over the Internet …[in essence], an extensive and sophisticated criminal marketplace.” The marketplace was designed for anonymity, according to the complaint, by allowing transactions only by Bitcoin and on TOR. The purpose of both was so that the identities and locations of users transmitting funds and buying and selling illegal product could be concealed.

The allegations note that Ulbricht provided the online platform that offered the sale of illegal services and goods, in other words, that facilitated illegal commerce on the Internet. The site was only accessible on the TOR network, a software web browser that hides IP addresses.

According to the criminal complaint, Silk Road sold, or facilitated the sale of, hundreds of kilograms of illegal drugs to well over 100,000 buyers and laundered the proceeds of crime. One could buy heroin, crystal meth, ecstasy, cocaine, and LSD, among others. Many of those vendors were from Canada.

According to the complaint, Silk Road also provided other goods and services including lists of murderers for hire, counterfeit currency, fake IDs and hacking experts who could hack into any Facebook or other social media account. The latter was apparently popular with suspicious married couples.

Ulbricht is also alleged to have bought several fake IDs from Canada that were intercepted by US customs and border agents during a routine search. The package ultimately helped FBI agents locate Ulbricht because the package was sent to his apartment in San Francisco.

The money laundering charges against Ulbricht allege that he violated §1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and §1956(a)(1)(B)(i) of Title 18, USC by engaging in foreign and interstate trade knowing that the financial transactions involved proceeds of crime from illegal activities (murder, hacking, fake ID trafficking and drug trafficking), and did so purposely to allegedly onceal the location, source, ownership, and control of the proceeds of the criminal activity.

Potential liability over terrorist attacks on critical infrastructure for private and government participants

By Christine Duhaime | September 15th, 2013

Terrorists will target critical infrastructure

Study after study makes one thing clear – the West remains ill-prepared to defend against a terrorist attack to critical infrastructure. That makes it obviously vulnerable, but it also exposes government agencies and the private sector (who own or manage upwards of 80% of critical infrastructure in some areas), among others, to potential risks and liability in the event of a terrorist attack. With respect to cyber-related infrastructure, in the U.S., the Department of Homeland Security reported a 383% increase in attempted or successful cyber attacks against critical infrastructure.

Terrorists are interested in targeting critical infrastructure, namely the systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, that are so vital that the incapacity or destruction of them would have a debilitating impact on national security, national economic security, national health or safety, or any combination of them.

Energy infrastructure interests them most apparently (electric power network, nuclear plants, oil pipelines, alternative energy systems), transportation infrastructure (ports, bridges, airports, train stations, tunnels) and more recently in the context of cyberterrorism, the financial system (banks, stock exchanges, credit card companies) because the inter-dependency of these forms of critical infrastructure on others and between governments, means that targeting these assets will create the most disruption to the most amount of people and significant economic damage.

Potential liability for terrorist attacks for private enterprise

Inevitably, terrorist attacks will lead to lawsuits. The difficulty for plaintiffs, however, is that the primary responsible parties (terrorists) are often out of the relevant jurisdiction and as a result, plaintiffs seek out numerous other defendants for recovery, normally those entities that designed, built, financed or invested in the targeted critical infrastructure project, and that currently manage, control, own or maintain it.

When such a lawsuit is commenced, the primary theory of potential liability for a terrorist attack is negligence. A defendant may be subject to liability under this theory if he owes a duty to the plaintiff and acts negligently in such a way as to cause the plaintiff an objectively foreseeable injury. The standard is an objective one and the courts apply the test of what a reasonable man would have done in the defendant’s position. What is reasonable under the circumstances depends.

Terrorist attacks to critical infrastructure are not just foreseeable, they are expected

But what is obvious and different, legally speaking, is that from 9/11 onwards, terrorist attacks are not just foreseeable, they are expected. Governments issue terrorist alerts frequently and terrorist organizations sometimes provide advance warnings of their intention to undertake critical infrastructure damage. The fact that terrorist attacks to critical infrastructure are expected places an enhanced obligation to protect the infrastructure assets.

The second theory of liability may be products liability. Typically, liability is imposed for design defects if the risk of a product as it is currently manufactured outweighs its utility when considered in light of any alternative designs. If we know terrorists will attack critical infrastructure, prudent entities involved in the project would assess whether they are designing, building and maintaining that infrastructure piece with a view to resilience and mitigation of harm from an attack, and whether there are alternative designs that could be used.

The scope of potential defendants arising out of a terrorist attack litigation is wide. They include, in respect of critical infrastructure, government agencies that regulate or oversee the infrastructure, asset managers, manufacturers, designers, owners, architects, construction companies, insurance companies, downstream service providers and lessors.

Government immunity not necessarily available

As the 1993 World Trade Centre garage bomb litigation in New York City demonstrated, government agencies may not necessarily be legally immune in respect of terrorist attacks. In that case, citizens and businesses sued the government agency that owned and operated the World Trade Centre facility to recover for injuries and losses incurred from the explosion. The government raised an immunity defence which the plaintiffs successfully rebutted by arguing that negligence arose out of government’s proprietary function. It’s duty in respect of security of the premises was part of its proprietary function as a commercial landlord because the ownership and care of the parking facility and the provision of these basic security measures for the commercial tenants, business invitees, and the public, were activities traditionally carried on through private enterprise, specifically by commercial landlords, and thus constituted proprietary functions when performed by a government agency.

The jury assigned fault for the destruction of the infrastructure to (a) the terrorists; and (b) the government for its failure to adopt more rigorous security measures recommended to it by its own security experts.

Governments agencies therefore should be careful of the roles they assume in P3 infrastructure projects and should not undertake any roles that, as a matter of common law, may later serve to erode government immunity.

Mitigating legal risks for critical infrastructure

There are a number of ways organizations involved in the delivery and maintenance of critical infrastructure can mitigate legal risks in the face of potential terrorist attacks.

A. Focus on risk allocation in contracts

Determining risk allocation is key.

An airport infrastructure guru based in Toronto once told me that risk allocation in P3 infrastructure is allocated to the party best equipped or suited to cope with, or manage, a risk coming to fruition. But no, if that were the case, risks would always be allocated to the party with the deepest pockets. Rather, risk allocation is always a product of negotiation and governments should not, as P3 partners, agree to risks (and liabilities) that should be part of the private sector’s responsibility.

Allocation of risks through careful risk allocation provisions (“RAP“) in contracts for the development and maintenance of critical infrastructure is vital, particularly post-closing RAPs. In this context, more complex RAPs do not equate to better RAPs – a Harvard study on lawyers who drafted complex M&A deals found that inexperienced or unqualified lawyers produce lengthy overly complex RAPs that are ineffective compared with experienced lawyers who produced short but effective RAPs. Quality, not length is key.

With respect to RAPs, parties should consider provisions that address indemnities, both as against loss or damage, and against liability, limitations of actions and of liability, and waiver of subrogation and insurance clauses.

Disaster-outs are also important but they should be reviewed carefully – too many disaster out clauses are imprecise or ill-conceived in respect of the allowed “outs” and provide for too many provisos. The more provisos required means the less likely a party will be able to exit a project that becomes economically non-viable as a result of a terrorist attack. The same applies to market outs, material change outs, and rating change outs.

Security risk management, like all risk management decisions, have financial consequences which should factor into the RAPs.

B. Disclosure of risks

In respect of investors to critical infrastructure projects, the disclosure of risks associated with terrorist attacks to critical infrastructure must be articulated in conjunction with the disclosure of other risks (i.e., in respect of financings, registration statements, prospectuses, OMs, AIFs). Securities legislation provides for criminal and civil penalties for failing to disclose material facts or making untrue statements of material facts. While under securities law, there is no obligation to disclose risks that could apply to any issuer or any offering, the risks to critical infrastructure from terrorism do not qualify as a generic risk applicable across the board and therefore disclosure is required. Providing disclosure of material risks of loss limits the liklihood that a corporation will be liable to investors if a loss occurs. In terms of terrorism-related risks, the disclosure required is in respect of the risk and consequences of an attack, insurance related thereto and the likelihood of being a potential defendant in the event of such an attack. Risks for cyber as well as physical terrorist attacks should be included as each carries its own set of risks and consequences.

C. Undertake risk assessments & implement controls

The parties that manage, control and own critical infrastructure can mitigate legal risks in connection with potential terrorist attacks by identifying the risks and effectively managing both foreseeable risks and identified threats to achieve security.

There are two types of terrorist attacks to be concerned with – physical and cyber attacks – and continuity of operations, through an intelligence and information-led risk informed approach is an important factor. Avoiding single source dependencies is one way to achieve continuity of operations.

Risk informed approaches involve the integration of threat, vulnerability, and consequence information. The subsequent risk management involves deciding which protective measures to take based on an agreed upon risk reduction strategy. Models and methodologies are developed by assessing which threats, vulnerabilities, and risks are integrated and using that data to allocate resources to reduce the risks. The risk landscape is constantly evolving and therefore, safety and security standards, concepts and measures should be dynamic. Risk assessments and implementation of reasonable controls will help mitigate liability.

Because the real burden for critical infrastructure protection may ultimately rest mainly on the shoulders of the private financing sector, public-private interaction based on clearly legally defined roles and responsibilities for disaster preparation, mitigation and management is also necessary.

The ultimate goal of security of infrastructure is to take prevention, mitigation and responsive measures across the supply chain to ensure asset integrity, reliability of supply and protection of people and the environment.

D. Take advantage of legal privilege for security assessments

On a more micro level, the practice of having legal counsel manage and engage external parties for security reviews and assessments of critical infrastructure is advisable. Such a practice imbues the engagement with privilege and confidentiality arising from the lawyer – client relationship, potentially protecting the end product from disclosure in the event of litigation. This is often done in the context of environmental and tax advice. The World Trade case referred to above wherein the government agency and private financing parties were liable for damages arising from a terrorist attack, is a case in point. In that case, the parties had commissioned a security assessment and failed to comply with the recommendations of the assessment. The security assessment was not obtained through an outside counsel engagement.

Conclusion

The unfortunate reality of a terrorist attack is that if and when it happens, it will inevitably result in chaos and disruption to the organizations targeted. In addition to loss of corporate assets, there may be deaths and injuries to deal with at the same time as infrastructure continuity service issues.

When the dust settles, the insurers, financiers, corporate entities and government agencies connected with that critical infrastructure will be subject to decades of legal claims and lawsuits – some they must start and some they must defend.

G20 agrees to immigration policy measures to crack down on corrupt immigrants and proceeds of crime imported into G20 countries, including deportation of wealthy foreign nationals

By Christine Duhaime | September 10th, 2013

Crackdown on foreign nationals with unverified funds

The G20 leaders have endorsed a sweeping plan proposed by its Anti-Corruption Working Group (“ACWG“) in 2012 to tackle the illicit movement of proceeds of crime internationally by corrupt foreign nationals to other countries (usually done as part of an immigration process). The change is part of a global ‘denial of safe haven’ policy designed to ensure that countries are not facilitators of financial crime committed by foreign nationals, whether it be tax evasion, money laundering, corruption or business immigration fraud.

Immigration connection & politically exposed persons

In their G20 Declaration and in the ACWG Action Plan, member countries agreed to implement immigration policy changes to refuse immigration applications (effectively deny entry) where there is corruption, usually involving high net worth foreign nationals, or high profile foreign nationals with unverified (or unverifiable) sources of funds. They are usually, but not always, politically exposed persons in anti-money laundering law.

To deny entry, the G20 members have agreed that it is sufficient that there be information to make a determination as to potential corruption, and that a conviction is not required to deny entry. Moreover, the denial of entry of prospective immigrants will extend to family members and close associates who immigration authorities believe may have derived a benefit from corruption.

The decision to make policy as opposed to legislative changes, means that member countries do not have to implement laws to begin addressing the immigration of corrupt persons.

Countries will share immigration information

The G20 also agreed to start sharing information with each other to identify foreign nationals who may be seeking immigration with sources of funds from corruption, or who move proceeds of crime from corruption to other countries. The policy change is retroactive in the sense that foreign nationals who have already immigrated to G20 member countries who may be suspected of corruption will be identified.

And finally, G20 states have also agreed to assist each other in bringing such persons to justice in their home countries, by deportation and other means and to facilitate the recovery of assets from proceeds of crime by seizing assets and repatriating the assets to the home country through MLAs.

The policy change means that foreign nationals will have to be prepared to have their funds vetted and confirmed as part of the immigration application process, otherwise they risk not only refusal of immigration but being reported to their home country if their funds are unverifiable and potentially connected to corruption. Foreign nationals should take steps as part of their immigration application to consider obtaining an independent verification of source of funds to ensure that there are no issues with their applications that will impact them.

The G20 are China, Canada, Japan, South Africa, France, Turkey, USA, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Mexico, Korea, Italy, Indonesia, India, European Union, Germany, UK, Brazil, Argentina, Australia.

Swiss and US enter into anti-tax evasion agreement with wide-reaching prosecution implications for Americans, foreigners, advisors and entities with which they are affiliated

By Christine Duhaime | September 2nd, 2013

Anti-Tax Evasion Agreement

The U.S. Department of Justice and the Swiss Federal Department of Finance have entered into an agreement that essentially ends Swiss bank secrecy and the renown of Switzerland as a tax haven.

The Agreement:

  1. Applies not just to American taxpayers but also to foreigners and foreign entities who maintain Swiss bank accounts if they are U.S. tax obliged persons under FATCA;
  2. Requires the disclosure of essentially every penny transferred in and out of closed Swiss bank accounts over the last five years by persons and entities who are caught by the Agreement, wherever situated. As a result, U.S. law enforcement will be able to follow the flow of funds to pursue tax evasion by learning from where, and to where, funds were transferred; and
  3. Requires the disclosure of professionals affiliated with the bank accounts or who acted as intermediaries in respect of the accounts. In the last few years, 4 lawyers, 5 asset managers, 1 trust advisor and 21 bankers have been indicted by the U.S. in connection with the use of Swiss bank accounts – the disclosure of this information means more indictments of advisors are forthcoming.

The Agreement Details

The Agreement allows Swiss banks to enter into non-prosecution agreements (“NPA“) with the DOJ to avoid criminal liability for, among other things, potential money laundering and conspiracy to defraud the IRS and facilitate tax evasion, in exchange for the disclosure to the DOJ of detailed bank account information about foreign bank account holders and the payment of billions of dollars in fines to the U.S. The Agreement also allows other categories of Swiss banks to receive comfort from the DOJ in respect of prosecution by way of a Non-Target Letter provided they undertake certain reviews of their accounts and share that information with the DOJ.

The aim of the Agreement appears to be fourfold – to flush out tax evaders (and secure the payment of unpaid taxes and penalties by them to the IRS); to flush out their advisors, and where expedient, prosecute them; to bring about the end of the use of foreign banks in tax havens for tax evasion for all U.S. tax obliged persons and entities; and to secure the payment to the U.S. of billions of dollars in penalties from Swiss and other banks worldwide in settlement of non-prosecution.

By virtue of its reference to the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, 124 Stat. 97-117 (“FATCA“), the Agreement applies not just to American natural and legal persons but also to foreigners and foreign legal persons in the same circumstances in which FATCA applies (“U.S. Tax Obliged Persons“). Due to its breadth, FATCA impacts virtually all non-U.S. entities, directly or indirectly, receiving most types of U.S. source income, including gross proceeds from the sale or disposition of U.S. property which can produce interest or dividends.

There are several stages to the NPA portion of the Agreement – the material provisions of which are set out below.

First Stage

The first stage involves the Swiss bank requesting to enter a NPA in which it provides a letter to the U.S. Tax Division making such a request by December 31, 2013. Subsequent to the written request but before entering into a NPA, the bank must provide to the U.S., certain information in respect of U.S. bank accounts (“U.S. Related Accounts“) it maintains (or maintained) from August 1, 2008 onwards which exceed $50,000 in value if there is evidence that a U.S. Tax Obliged Person has a financial or beneficial interest in, ownership of, or some measure of authority over (such as trade confirmations), the U.S. Related Account. The bank must also provide information on how the U.S. Related Accounts were structured, operated and supervised; the name and function of the persons who managed the accounts; how the bank attracted and serviced account holders; and number of accounts and aggregate dollar value.

Second Stage

In the second stage, the Swiss bank enters into a NPA pursuant to which it agrees to pay, and pays, the U.S. a penalty ranging from 20% – 50% of the aggregate value of the U.S. Related Accounts it maintained over the relevant period of time. The range depends upon when the Swiss bank accepted funds from U.S. Tax Obliged Persons – 50% being applicable for funds accepted after February 28, 2009.

Pursuant to the terms of the NPA, Swiss banks must close U.S. Relevant Accounts of all recalcitrant account holders, namely those who do not evince an intention to comply with IRS disclosure requirements. In the future, if a participating Swiss bank opens an account for a U.S. Tax Obliged Person, it must ensure that the account is declared to the U.S.

The Swiss bank must also agree to provide expert testimony for U.S. criminal prosecutions that will arise from the disclosure of information provided to the U.S. under the Agreement for charges that may include tax evasion and money laundering.

Third Stage

In the third stage, after entering into a NPA, the bank must provide additional information on the names and details of holders of closed U.S. Related Accounts. That disclosure includes the following:

  1. Dollar value of each U.S. Related Account;
  2. Name of U.S. Related Account holders and whether held by legal or natural persons;
  3. Beneficial interest information;
  4. Whether U.S. securities were held, and details in respect thereof;
  5. Names of lawyers, fiduciaries, asset managers, accountants, financial advisors, trustees, nominees, and anyone else affiliated with the U.S. Related Accounts;
  6. Details on the transfer of funds into and out of the U.S. Related Accounts on a monthly basis, including where such funds were deposited to and from and whether an intermediary was involved (such as lawyers, trustees and other third parties, and if so, their names); and
  7. Names of financial institutions involved in the transfers of funds, wherever situated worldwide.

The Agreement does not apply to approximately 14 Swiss banks that are currently the subject of U.S. criminal investigation in respect of bank secrecy and tax evasion.

The Wegelin Prosecution & Money Laundering 

The impetus for the Agreement was the indictment and conviction this year of Switzerland’s oldest private bank, Wegelin & Co. (“Wegelin“), and the criminal forfeiture of millions of dollars held by Wegelin at a U.S. correspondent bank as proceeds of crime (money laundering property). Wegelin did not survive the reputational sting of the money laundering criminal forfeiture and the indictment and was forced out of business after 272 years.

Wegelin provided private banking and wealth management services to, among others, U.S. Tax Obliged Persons, some of whom were evading the payment of U.S. taxes. It continued to maintain accounts when it was aware that the purpose of the accounts was to evade taxes and assisted certain taxpayers violate their duty to report to the IRS. Wegelin obtained a legal opinion (which it now knows was incorrect), that it would never be prosecuted by the U.S. for such conduct because it had no branches or offices in the U.S. However, it did have a correspondent relationship with UBS in the U.S. and its legal opinion incorrectly stated that the US does not have jurisdiction over foreign banks.

It pled guilty earlier this year to conspiracy to defraud the IRS, file false federal income tax returns, and evade federal income taxes by essentially helping U.S. Tax Obliged Persons hide more than $1.2 billion from the IRS. It accepted deposits from natural persons and legal persons, including from off-shore companies and foundations established under the laws of Panama, Hong Kong and Leichtenstein.

It ultimately paid more than $74 million to the U.S. — $20 million in restitution, a fine of $22 million, forfeiture of $15 million and the abandonment of its claim of over $16 million already forfeited to the U.S. as money laundering property.