British judge extradited to Italy on money laundering charges

By Christine Duhaime | July 1st, 2012

Judge extradited for suspected money laundering

Colin Dines, a retired British judge and former criminal law lawyer, is being extradited from London to Rome to face charges by an Italian magistrate that he was part of a transnational criminal organization complicit in laundering £344 million at the behest of the Mafia.

In 2010, an European Arrest Warrant (“EAW“) was issued against him seeking his extradition. EAWs were approved by the European Union in 2002 to facilitate the extradition of EU citizens to member states to face prosecution. Mr. Dines unsuccessfully appealed his extradition before the England and Wales High Court. In rendering their decision, Lord Justice Hooper and Mr. Justice Singh ruled that there was sufficient evidence showing that Mr. Dines was involved in the alleged money laundering scheme. Mr. Dines subsequently unsuccessfully appealed extradition to the European Court of Human Rights. His son, Andrew Dines, is also being extradited to face similar charges.

The England and Wales High Court decision, Neave v. Court of Rome, [2012] EWHC 358, is available here.

Record prison sentence imposed on lawyer for insider trading and money laundering

By Christine Duhaime | June 6th, 2012

New York lawyer, Matthew Kluger, was sentenced yesterday in federal court in New Jersey to 12 years in prison for insider trading. His sentence is the longest term ever imposed for that crime in the U.S.

Kruger stole undisclosed transactional information on approximately 30 deals when he was a corporate lawyer with several U.S. law firms including Cravath, Swain & Moore LLP and Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. The deals involved Sun Microsystems Inc., 3Com Corp. and Acxiom Corp. According to U.S. prosecutors, trades from the illegal tips generated US$37 million. Kluger tipped off a middleman who subsequently tipped New York securities trader Garrett Bauer, using disposable cellular phones to escape detection. The illegal activity spanned 17 years.

Kluger pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering, securities fraud, conspiracy to commit securities fraud, and obstruction of justice. The latter were connected to the destruction of cellular phones and computers following an FBI probe into Kluger’s affairs. Bauer and Kluger have forfeited approximately US$20 million to U.S. government agencies, a US$6.65 million condominium in Manhattan and a home in Florida.

Ottawa Professor ordered extradited to France to face charges over terrorist attack

By Christine Duhaime | April 5th, 2012

Canada’s Minister of Justice and Attorney General has ordered the extradition of Canadian Sociology professor Hassan Diab to France to face charges of murder, attempted murder and destruction of property related to the 1980 terrorist attack on a synagogue in Paris that killed 4 people, and injured 40 others. The terrorist attack was anti-semitic and took place on the day of the celebration of Simchat Torah, the final day of a Jewish festival.

Under Canada’s Extradition Act, a hearing is held to determine whether a person can be extradited. At that hearing, the judge must be satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case that an extraditable crime has been committed. If committal is ordered, the Minister of Justice then decides whether the person sought should be surrendered to the requesting state. Although France’s case against Diab is largely circumstantial, an Ontario court ruled last year that the evidence against Diab was sufficient to establish a prima facie case. As a result, Diab was committed for extradition. He has appealed that decision to the Ontario Court of Appeal.

Diab is under house arrest in Ottawa.

Hong Kong Court of Appeal overturns money laundering conviction of person who used underground currency exchanger

By Christine Duhaime | March 30th, 2012

Surprising Decision

Today, the Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal gave its reasons for judgment in the case of HKSAR and Yan Suiling.

The Court quashed the conviction of Yan Suiling for money laundering in Hong Kong even though the Appellant, Yan admitted she engaged in illegal currency exchanges and accepted proceeds of crime into her bank account.

The facts of the case are interesting and shed some light on the underground flow of currency from Mainland China to Hong Kong and the extent to which such activities are accepted as part of the normal way of doing business between China and Hong Kong.

The Facts

Yan was a businesswoman and accountant who lived in Hong Kong and was originally from the Mainland. She was an active trader of securities.

In 2004, in order to remove undeclared funds from Mainland China, Yan began using a black market currency exchanger in China. The currency exchanger was a manager at a bank in Mainland China, known simply as Mr. Ting, who later asked Yan to deal directly with his wife, known simply as Madam Chu.

Whenever Yan needed a currency exchange transaction completed, she would deposit an amount in RMB into unidentified accounts in Mainland China and Madam Chu would then cause to be deposited an equivalent amount in the requested foreign currency into Yan’s bank account at HSBC in Hong Kong. Yan never knew or took steps to find out who owned the bank accounts in Mainland China where she deposited funds, or the persons who deposited funds into her bank account.

In March, 2009, Yan instructed her mother in China to deposit $3 million into a bank account in China designated by Madam Chu. In exchange, Yan received six cheques and two cash deposits in Hong Kong and two days later, a cash remittance of HKD$150,000 – for a total of HKD$3,511,355 in exchange for her $3 million.

One of the cheques deposited into Yan’s bank account for HKD$2.3 million was drawn from the account of a man in Shenzhen whom Yan did not know and it was proceeds of crime resulting from mortgage fraud that had occurred in China. The holder of that bank account was a co-defendant with Yan at her trial and was also a client of Madam Chu.

The mortgage fraud involved a fraudulent mortgage from Fubon Bank that was secured against an apartment in China. The funds from the mortgage were deposited to a lawyer’s trust account and after deducting fees and expenses, the lawyer transferred HKD$8,591,000 into another bank account with Fubon Bank, opened by the fraudster. The cheque in question for HKD$2.3 million was then deposited from this account into Yan’s bank account.

Yan and the co-defendant did not know each other and Yan had no knowledge of or involvement in the mortgage fraud.

Yan was charged with dealing with property derived from an indictable offence under §25(1) and (3) of Chapter 455 of the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance of Hong Kong. That section makes it an offence to deal with property knowingly or having reasonable grounds to believe that it is proceeds of an indictable offence.

She was convicted and her appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed.

Lower Court Judgment

The trial judge accepted that in order to trade in the Hong Kong stock exchange, Yan had to engage in the underground currency exchange system.

However, he found Yan evidence unreasonable and unbelievable for several reasons. Those relevant to money laundering are that:

(a) No reasonable person would have engaged the services of Madam Chu to deal with such large sums of money totalling in the millions:

  1. Without ascertaining whether Madam Chu was licensed as a currency exchanger; and
  2. Given the inherent risk in remitting large sums to accounts of persons unknown to her, without first ensuring that she would be repaid;

(b) The deposits she received were always in separate sums and she never asked why;

(c) She was never concerned about the high exchange rates charged; and

(d) An incredibly high degree of coincidence would be needed for Madam Chu to be able to make arrangements with different parties to come up with exactly matching amounts to transfer to Yan, time and again.

Yan appealed the dismissal of the appeal to the Court of Final Appeal of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on the ground that she did not know and had no reasonable grounds to believe that the cheque represented proceeds of crime.

The Appeal Decision

The Court of Final Appeal concluded that the reasoning from the trial judge was flawed because there is a well-known underground banking economy in Hong Kong for illegal currency exchanges which involve inherent risks, such as those identified by the lower court. It went on to hold that no law abiding person would assume those risks.

The Court of Final Appeal went on to hold that even if the trial judge was right to discredit Yan’s evidence, there was no basis to conclude that Yan had reasonable grounds to believe the cheque represented the proceeds of crime from an indictable offence.

The Court noted that money laundering involves knowingly converting the proceeds of crime into other forms of property to cloak the illicit proceeds with legitimacy and it found that Yan never knowingly took such steps. The Court of Final Appeal held that there were plenty of other legitimate reasons to explain how untraceable and unidentifiable funds landed in Yan’s bank account time and time again in the exact amounts exchanged including by accident.

The Court held that the mere fact that a large sum of money was deposited into the Appellant’s bank account by someone unknown to her and that she did not make any enquiry is unusual, but there could be a number of explanations and possible consequences of her inaction. The money might have come to her by mistake and she might be held answerable in a civil action for its return. She might even be liable for prosecution in respect of some other offence(s). However, we do not think that without more, an unexplained receipt points irresistibly to money laundering.

Yan was acquitted of money laundering and her conviction overturned.

The acquittal is unusual. Yan testified that she was aware that her currency exchange activities were illegal – that’s why she did it because she could not remove funds legally from China. She was also aware that the exchanged funds in Hong Kong were there by illegal means.

The decision hypothesized that the funds transferred to her bank account in Hong Kong could have been deposited there by mistake.

Only they weren’t. Yan admitted they were purposely deposited there by Madam Chu as part of Yan’s underground currency transactions.

The case is available here.

Canada introduces nuclear terrorism law

By Christine Duhaime | March 27th, 2012

Canada has introduced anti-nuclear terrorism legislation to fully implement the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Australia enacted similar legislation a month ago.

Bill S-9 – the Nuclear Terrorism Act, amends the Criminal Code as follows:

  • it creates an offence of possessing or trafficking nuclear or radioactive material or a nuclear or radioactive device, or committing an act against a nuclear facility or its operations with the intent to cause death, serious bodily harm or substantial damage to property or the environment. On conviction, the offence carries a term of life imprisonment;
  • it creates an offence for using or altering nuclear or radioactive material or a nuclear or radioactive device, or committing an act against a nuclear facility or its operations with the intent to compel a person, a government or a domestic or international organization to do, or refrain from doing, anything (also, on conviction, a term of life imprisonment);
  • it creates an offence for the commission of an indictable offence for the purpose of obtaining nuclear or radioactive material or device, or to obtain access or control of a nuclear facility and is intended to criminalize, for example, theft of nuclear material or the use of violence to obtain such material;
  • it creates a specific offence of threatening to commit any of the offences above;
  • it gives courts in Canada extraterritorial jurisdiction to try these offences in situations where, for example, the offence is committed outside Canada by a Canadian or when the person who commits the act or omission outside Canada is present in Canada (similar to the extraterritorial jurisdiction that exists in relation to terrorism offences); and
  • it gives the Attorney General of Canada concurrent prosecutorial authority over nuclear terrorism offences, in the same way the AG assumes such authority over terrorism offences, in lieu of the provinces and territories.

Omnibus crime bill receives Royal Assent and impacts anti-terrorism laws

By Christine Duhaime | March 13th, 2012

The Safe Streets and Communities Act, (Bill C-10), also known as the omnibus crime bill received Royal Assent today in Parliament and is significant from an anti-terrorism perspective.

Justice for Victims of Terrorism

Bill C-10 enacts the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (the “Act”) which creates a cause of action that allows victims of terrorism to sue natural and legal persons and listed entities for loss or damages suffered as a result of acts or omissions that are punishable under Part II.1 of the Criminal Code (the terrorism offences). It also allows victims to sue foreign states that supported terrorist entities. Claims are available whether the loss occurred inside or outside Canada after January 1, 1985, however, if the loss occurs outside Canada, there must be a real and substantial connection to Canada. The U.S. is the only jurisdiction to have similar legislation.

The Act also suspends certain limitation periods where the victims are incapable of commencing an action because of physical, mental and psychological conditions, or when the victim is unable to ascertain the identity of a perpetrator. Interestingly, the Act hinges significantly on listed entities and their terrorist activities. With respect to prospective defendants, under the Act a defendant is presumed to have committed the terrorist act if the listed entity caused or contributed to the loss or damage and the defendant committed the act for the listed entity.

Bill C-10 also amends the State Immunity Act to create a new exception to state immunity, the general rule that prevents states from being sued in Canada’s domestic courts. The exception serves to remove state immunity only when the state in question has been placed on a list established by Cabinet on the basis that there are reasonable grounds to believe that it has supported or currently supports terrorism.

International Transfer of Offenders Act

Bill C-10 also amends the International Transfer of Offenders Act by giving the Minister discretionary powers in deciding whether to approve the repatriation of Canadians incarcerated abroad. Formerly, the legislation required the Minister to consider certain factors in considering a transfer request. Now, the analysis is subjective and gives the Minister the discretion to consider factors such as whether the offender’s return would be a threat to the security of Canada; whether the offender left or remained outside of Canada with the intention to abandon Canada as his or her place of residence; whether the offender has ties to Canada; and whether the foreign prison system presents a threat to the offender’s security or human rights.

Additional discretionary factors have also been added such as whether the offender will endanger public safety; the offender’s health; whether the offender is likely to engage in criminal activity; whether the offender cooperated with law enforcement; whether the offender accepted responsibility for his or her actions; and any other factor the Minister considers relevant. The addition of factors will mean that fewer Canadian offenders will be repatriated, not more.

Restriction of Conditional Sentences

Bill C-10 also brings into law amendments to the Criminal Code that fundamentally change important aspects of Canada’s criminal justice system, including amendments to §742.1 which restrict the availability of conditional sentences (i.e., house arrest). Under the amendments, conditional sentences are not available for a person convicted of an offence prosecuted by way of indictment for which the maximum term of imprisonment is 14 years or life (such as treason, mutiny, passport forgery, sedition, piracy, seizure of aircraft, facilitating or enhancing the activities of terrorists and perjury whether by affidavit, oath or declaration) or for certain offences prosecuted by way of indictment for which the maximum term of imprisonment is 10 years (terrorist financing, dealing with terrorist property, providing services in respect of terrorist property that benefits the terrorist group and failure to disclose to CSIS and RCMP the existence of terrorist property).

Conditional sentencing, introduced in September 1996, allows for sentences of imprisonment to be served in the community, rather than in a correctional facility. It is a midway point between incarceration and sanctions such as probation or fines. With the coming into force of Bill C-10, a person convicted of certain serious offences can no longer serve a sentence in the community.

Canada still a jurisdiction of concern for money laundering says U.S.

By Christine Duhaime | March 10th, 2012

Canada was listed as a jurisdiction of money laundering concern by the U.S. Department of State in its annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, available here.

Other jurisdictions of concerns include Columbia, Brazil, Afghanistan, Venezuela, Mexico Russia and Somalia. The findings are similar to those reported by the U.S. Department of State in its 2011 report and include the following:

  • Money laundering in Canada derives primarily from the trade in illegal narcotics, chemical precursors and psychotropic substances;
  • Among the drug-related findings:
    • Canada is the leading supplier of ecstasy in North America and most of the supply is from British Columbia;
    • Canada is a major producer and shipper of methamphetamine for markets around the world, particularly to the U.S., Australia, Japan and New Zealand;
    • Marijuana is the most widely used drug in Canada and most of it is grown in British Columbia by Asian criminal gangs and associates of the Hells Angels;
    • Although heroin use is shrinking in Canada, Canadian are among the heaviest consumers of illegal pharmaceutical opiates such as Ativan (lorazepam), Valium (diazepam), Ritalin (methylphenidate), Oxycontin (oxycodone), Klonopin (clonazepam), and Talwin (pentazocine);
  • Canada has an unacceptable conviction rate for money laundering;
  • FINTRAC takes too long to deal with suspicious transaction reports;
  • The failure of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act to apply to lawyers is an impediment to the effectiveness of the anti-money laundering regime;  and
  • Budgetary constraints reduce the effective of the anti-money laundering regime.

President Barack Obama noted in the Report that the stealth with which marijuana and synthetic drugs such as ecstasy and methamphetamine are produced in Canada and trafficked to the U.S. was of concern.

Bodog indicted in U.S. for money laundering

By Christine Duhaime | February 29th, 2012

The U.S. Attorney for the District of Maryland, Rod J. Rosenstein, today announced that Bodog Entertainment Group S.A. has been indicted for money laundering conspiracy and operating an illegal gambling business that provided services to U.S. customers in the U.S. Also indicted were Calvin Ayre, James Philip, David Ferguson and Derrick Maloney, all from Canada.

The U.S. Attorney is alleging that the defendants and their conspirators moved funds from Bodog’s accounts located in Canada, Switzerland, England, Malta, and elsewhere to pay winnings to gamblers, and to pay media brokers and advertisers located in the U.S. They are also alleged to have directed payment processors to send at least US$100 million by wire and by cheques to gamblers.

Acting IRS Special Agent in Charge Eric Hylton said: “Laundering money from illegal activity such as illegal internet gambling is a crime. Regardless of how the money changes hands – via cash, check, wire transfers or credit cards – and regardless of where the money is stored – in a U.S. financial institution or an offshore bank – we will trace the funds.”

The money laundering charges will facilitate the extradition of the four non-corporate defendants from Canada to the U.S. Under the FATF Recommendations, extradition requests for money laundering must be executed by Canada without delay. When a money laundering charge is involved, Canada should allow direct transmission of requests for provisional arrests to the U.S. and should extradite persons based only on warrants of arrests or judgments.

FATF Releases New Recommendations and Standards for Anti-Money Laundering

By Christine Duhaime | February 16th, 2012

Today, the Paris-based Financial Action Task Force (FATF) released its long anticipated revised set of standards for anti-money laundering (AML) and counter terrorist financing (CTF) which replace the 40 Recommendations + 9 Special Recommendations compiled in 2003. The revised FATF Recommendations integrate AML and CTF controls into one document and are quite expansive in that they expand the mandate of the FATF into the supervision of international policy for proceeds of corruption, tax crimes and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The material changes are as follows:

  1. Risk-Based Approach – Confirmation that countries are required to adopt a risk-based approach to their AML and CTF laws, and not a set of laws applicable to all reporting sectors regardless of identified risks. The FATF indicated that the implementation of the risk-based approach will require governments and the private sector (reporting entities) to work in partnership, to clearly understand the money laundering and terrorist financing risks that affect them, and to adapt their systems to the nature of these risks. The underlying principle, clearly stated in the revised Recommendations, is that enhanced measures should be applied where the risks are higher, and simplified measures applied where the risks are lower.
  2. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction – Governments should implement economic sanctions to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the financing thereof. This Recommendation is consistent with the UN Security Council Resolutions relating to the prevention, suppression and disruption of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and its financing that require countries pursuant to sanctions regimes, to freeze the funds and assets of those identified as associated with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
  3. National Policies on AML – Governments will have to undertake reviews and assessments of the risks of AML/CTF in reporting sectors and based on those reviews, adopt national AML/CTF policies.
  4. Politically Exposed Persons – Clarification that PEP rules apply to domestic, and not just foreign, PEPs. Some countries, such as Canada, have no AML/CTF measures in place with respect to domestic PEPs, even though there is no evidence that foreign PEPs are any more corrupt than domestic PEPs or pose a greater money laundering or terrorist financing risk. A PEP will now also include close associates of the PEP. A PEP is a person who holds a prominent public position (i.e., head of state, head of government, member of legislature, judge, ambassador, military officer, president or CEO of Crown corporation).
  5. Transparency as to Legal Persons – The Recommendations contain several changes that will require the transparency of corporations and trusts; specifically, governments need to ensure that reporting entities can easily access incorporation information and information as to trusts, including names of shareholders of private and public corporations, their directors and officers, and names of trusts and their trustees and beneficiaries.
  6. New Technologies – Countries and banks will have to identify and assess the money laundering and terrorist financing risks with new products and services (such as prepaid access and virtual currencies like Bitcoin) before permitting those products and services to be made available in the marketplace, and will be required to take measures to mitigate any risks associated with new products or services.

There are several additional changes as well. The FATF Recommendations are available on the FATF website.

Cross border currency exports or imports – a primer

By Christine Duhaime | January 15th, 2012

The government is introducing measures that would allow Canada Border Services Agency officers to question people arriving in or departing from Canada with respect to their responsibilities under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act and would require FINTRAC to disclose to CBSA, information relevant not only for immigration purposes, but also for the purposes of determining money laundering or terrorist financing.

Under the PCMLTFA, every person must report without delay to the CBSA the importation into Canada or exportation out of Canada of currency or monetary instruments equal to or that exceed $10,000. Monetary instruments include shares, bonds, debentures, bank cheques or bank drafts, promissory notes, travellers cheques and money orders, provided they are in bearer form and title passes upon delivery.

Every year, approximately $8.2 million is seized from Canadians and travelers to Canada by the CBSA because of a failure to report the importation or exportation of currency or monetary instruments. A person may import into Canada or export from Canada any amount, however, amounts equal to or greater than $10,000 must be reported to CBSA.

When a person is suspected of importing or exporting currency or a monetary instrument equal to or greater than $10,000, the CBSA officer may search the person, their luggage and any conveyances.  If funds are located, the CBSA may seize them if the officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that the reporting requirements of the PCMLTFA have not been complied with. The CBSA uses “sniffer dogs” at airports and other points of entry that can detect money.

Several recent cases have confirmed that a person can be convicted of a failure to report under the PCMLTFA without having formed the intent to commit the act.

For example, in 2004, a truck driver, Van Phat Hoang, was driving across Canada and mistakenly exited to the U.S. border in the middle of the night in his truck. He had $70,000 cash with him. He turned around before reaching the U.S. checkpoint and upon re-entering Canada, his funds were seized and forfeited to the Crown because he had failed to complete a report with CBSA.

Between 2003 and 2007, most of the seizures at the border involved undeclared currency, followed by travellers cheques, bank drafts, regular cheques, money order and share certificates.

Cross border currency reports are shared between Canada and the U.S. In the U.S., over $107 million is seized from travelers or Americans in undeclared or illicit currency every year.